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I. INTRODUCTION  
Does being pregnant when you commit a crime make you more 
culpable than someone who is not pregnant?  Accordingly to new and 
frightening precedent, the answer is yes.  In July 2014, a District Court 
judge decided that Lacey Weld, a Tennessee woman, “should face a 
longer prison sentence because she was pregnant at the time she was 
involved in a [methamphetamine (“meth”)] manufacturing operation.”1  
                                                
* J.D. Candidate, Florida State University College of Law 2016. Special thanks to 
Sam Wiseman for his support. 
1 Katie McDonough, Federal Judge: Pregnancy Can Be Grounds for Enhanced 
Criminal Penalties, SALON (July 15, 2014), 
http://www.salon.com/2014/07/15/tennessee_woman_may_face_a_double_prison_se
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The judge “elect[ed] to impose an enhanced sentence on the grounds 
of child endangerment.”2  He cited “substantial risk of harm to a 
minor” to justify the enhanced sentence.3  U.S. Attorney William C. 
Killian issued a statement indicating that the precedent will guide 
future sentencing, citing a “tragic rise” in the number of drug-addicted 
babies, and saying that “[t]hrough this prosecution, the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office sends a message that, should a child, born or unborn, be 
exposed to a substantial risk of harm through the manufacture of 
methamphetamine, we will pursue any available enhancements at 
sentencing.”4  
The question before the judge in United States v. Weld was 
twofold: whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) 
involving child endangerment apply to fetuses, and whether “women 
should be subject to a distinct set of laws by virtue of their 
pregnancies.” 5   Judge Varlan answered both questions in the 
affirmative.6  In this note, however, I argue that the decision in Weld 
sets “a dangerous legal precedent for gender discriminatory laws, and 
could establish de facto fetal personhood as a judicial fiat.”7   
Following Judge Varlan’s opinion, Weld appealed to the 
United State Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.8  The Sixth 
Circuit, however, granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss, 
effectively affirming Judge Varlan’s decision.9  As a result of this 
case, there are now: (1) separate and unequal laws that apply to 
women from the moment they carry a fertilized egg; (2) crimes that 
exist for pregnant women only; and (3) women that are subject to 
doubly punitive laws.10   
Although the debate regarding drug-addicted criminals 
culminated in the 1980s and early 1990s with the “crack baby” 
hysteria, the debate is now rearing its ugly head again through 
                                                                                                               
ntence_simply_because_she_was_pregnant/; see also United States v. Weld, 619 F. 
App’x 512, 513 (6th Cir. 2015). 
2 McDonough, supra note 1. 
3 Lacey Weld Sentenced to More Than 12 Years in Prison for Conspiracy to 
Manufacture Methamphetamine: Manufacturing and Smoking Methamphetamine 
While Pregnant Results in Enhanced Sentence, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 15, 2014) 
[hereinafter Lacey Weld Sentenced to More Than 12 Years], 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/tne/news/2014/July/071514%20Weld%20Sentencing%
20Meth.html. 
4 Id.  
5 McDonough, supra note 1; see also Weld, 619 F. App’x at 513. 
6 McDonough, supra note 1. 
7 Id. 
8 Weld, 619 F. App’x at 513. 
9 Id. 
10 McDonough, supra note 1 (reporting remarks from Lynn Paltrow, executive 
director of National Advocates for Pregnant Women).  
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sentencing decisions. 11   “States have primarily used child abuse, 
neglect, endangerment, controlled substance, homicide, and 
manslaughter statutes to punish pregnant drug-addicted women for 
allegedly exposing their fetuses to potential harm.”12  But using these 
enhancements to punish pregnant drug-addicted women is simply bad 
policy.  States argue that “these prosecutions are to protect the fetus 
from abuse and to deter women from using drugs during pregnancy”; 
however, instead of providing mothers with much-needed drug 
treatment, the prosecutorial strategy results in sending “a considerable 
number of women to prison.”13  
This note explores how laws criminalizing pregnant women 
have developed and argues that recent sentencing decisions violate 
women’s rights and are dangerous to society.  It presents non-judicial 
remedies, such as treatment and early-intervention, as solutions to 
handle the problem of pregnant drug-addicted women and drug-
exposed newborns.  
While likely constitutional due to state interest in health and 
public safety, and the lack of explicit targeting of suspect classes, these 
sentencing decisions nonetheless implicate constitutional concerns, 
impact abortion rights, and are a poor interpretation of the Guidelines.  
This note, therefore, argues that Weld’s sentence was excessively 
punitive because fetuses are not people or “minors” under the 
Guidelines, and even if they were, the harm to a drug-exposed fetus is 
not so severe as to warrant the use of the “substantial risk of harm to a 
minor” enhancement.14  Thus, the Weld decision should be reversed, 
and child endangerment enhancements should be prohibited for 
pregnant drug-addicted women.  
 
II. LACEY WELD: A CASE STUDY 
Lacey Weld (“Weld”), a twenty-six-year-old woman, “was 
picked up in an undercover sting at a meth[] manufacturing plant” in 
rural Jefferson County, Tennessee.15  Weld cooperated in the case and 
                                                
11 See generally Michael Winerip, Revisiting the “Crack Babies” Epidemic That Was 
Not, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/booming/revisiting-the-crack-babies-epidemic-
that-was-not.html?_r=0 (describing the 1980’s hysteria that revolved around 
“predictions that a generation of children would be damaged for life” because of the 
use of crack cocaine).  
12 Tiffany Lyttle, Stop the Injustice: A Protest Against the Unconstitutional 
Punishment of Pregnant Drug-Addicted Women, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
781, 783 (2006). 
13 Id. at 781-82. 
14 Weld, 619 F. App’x at 513. 
15 Amanda Marcotte, Tennessee Sentenced a Woman to Six Extra Years in Jail 
Simply Because She Was Pregnant, SLATE (Oct. 13, 2014), 
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testified against her co-defendants. 16   She pled guilty and “was 
sentenced to more than 12 years in prison and five years of supervised 
release for her involvement in meth manufacturing.”17  Judge Varlan, 
who decided the case for the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Tennessee, used the Guidelines’ enhancements to 
tack on an additional six years because Weld was pregnant at the time 
of her arrest.18  
The question in Weld’s case was not about adding additional 
charges because she was pregnant, but rather whether the court should 
enhance her sentence for crimes to which she already pled guilty.19  
Ultimately, Judge Varlan enhanced Weld’s sentence for putting her 
unborn child at a substantial risk of harm.20  However, Weld was not 
convicted for smoking meth; she pled guilty for conspiracy to 
manufacture meth.21  The Department of Justice nevertheless justified 
the penalty, in part, because Weld had “apparently used 
methamphetamine while pregnant.”22  But “[d]rug use . . . is not a 
crime under either Tennessee or federal law.”23  Therefore, imposing 
“criminal sanctions for using meth, a non-existent crime, violates clear 
due process principles and prohibitions on ex post facto laws.”24  
Here, “Weld was convicted of manufacturing, not possession 
of, methamphetamine.” 25   “Tennessee law allows sentence 
enhancements if the victim is especially vulnerable, but Weld was not 
convicted of victimizing her son.  Those six extra years were for a 
crime that isn’t a crime in Tennessee at all.”26  Unarguably, “Weld’s 
son was born sick and . . . ‘tested positive for opioids and meth[].’”27  
                                                                                                               
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/10/13/lacey_weld_case_tennessee_wom
an_gets_six_extra_years_in_prison_for_being.html; see also Kristen Gwynne, A 
Woman Got Six Extra Years In Prison Because She Was Pregnant, VICE (Oct. 10, 
2014), http://www.vice.com/read/a-woman-got-six-extra-years-in-prison-because-
she-was-pregnant-1010.  
16 Gwynne, supra note 15.  
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Weld, 619 F. App’x at 513. 
20 Id.  
21 Id.; see also Marcotte, supra note 15.   
22 Marcotte, supra note 15. 
23 Id. (quoting Letter from Lynn M. Paltrow, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Advocates for 
Pregnant Women, to Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Oct. 7, 
2014) [hereinafter Letter from Lynn M. Paltrow], 
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/DOJ%20Weld%20Letter%20-
%20signed.pdf). 
24 Letter from Lynn M. Paltrow, supra note 23 (emphasis in original).   
25 Marcotte, supra note 15.  
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
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Afterwards, Weld expressly accepted “responsibility for exposing her 
son to drugs in utero, telling the court, ‘He could have died, and I just 
pray and thank God that my sister has him and he’s OK.’”28  
However, many things can cause harm to a fetus in utero, 
including consumption of caffeine or alcohol, using tobacco, and even 
lack of sleep or too much exercise.29  Accordingly, Weld’s defense 
attorney, John Eldridge, said, “There’s no proof as to what caused the 
withdrawal.  There was drug use, and there was exposure in a meth lab 
. . . [Testimony] just said opioids and meth were in the baby’s system, 
so the judge concluded that it was meth exposure [which caused 
withdrawal symptoms].  I think it’s opioids.”30 
Generally, the law does not punish women for behaving badly 
while pregnant. 31   These sentence enhancements, however, are 
criminalizing otherwise non-criminal acts for pregnant women.32  In 
Weld’s case, she received an enhanced sentence because she took part 
in an unhealthy, but not illegal, activity while pregnant.33  Allowing 
punishment for legal, albeit unhealthy, choices opens the door to all 
types of paternalistic “policing of pregnant women’s behavior.”34  
Eldridge also reported that he did not believe that “this 
particular [sentencing] enhancement was ever designed for pregnant 
women.”35  Eldridge believed that the law was “intended to prevent 
‘substantial risk of harm to life of a minor or an incompetent’ [and] 
do[es] not mention harm to a fetus.”36  While there is no “civil right to 
be pregnant in a meth lab,” pregnant women have the right to be 
treated the same as those who are not pregnant in the criminal justice 
system.37   
 
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH PUNISHING PREGNANT DRUG-ADDICTED 
WOMEN FOR HARM TO A FETUS 
The act of punishing pregnant drug-addicted mothers has faced 
harsh criticism, and for good reason.  In addition to implicating 
                                                
28 Id. 
29 Id.; see also Gwynne, supra note 15.  See generally Int’l Union v. Johnson 
Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 914 n.7 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting 
that an estimated 15 to 20 million jobs entail exposure to chemicals that pose fetal 
risk). 
30 Gwynne, supra note 15. 
31 Marcotte, supra note 15; Gwynne, supra note 15. 
32 Marcotte, supra note 15. 
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Gwynne, supra note 15. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
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constitutional rights and misunderstanding medical science, 
criminalizing pregnancy has been criticized as a mechanism for 
enforcing racial oppression deeply rooted in the tragic practice of 
slavery.38  
A. Bad Policy 
The tragedy of drug-exposed babies is initially a tragedy of 
drug-addicted mothers.39  “Both are part of a larger tragedy of a 
community that is suffering a host of indignities, including, 
significantly, the denial of equal respect for its women’s reproductive 
decisions.”40  “[T]he punishment of drug addicts who chose to carry 
their pregnancies to term violates their constitutional rights to equal 
protection and privacy regarding their reproductive choices.”41  Using 
child endangerment sentence enhancements not only conflicts with 
constitutional concerns, but also fails to properly protect fetal health, 
as demonstrated below. 
“Poor crack addicts are punished for having babies because 
they fail to measure up to the state’s ideal of motherhood.”42  This is 
best illustrated in cases where prosecutors charge women who use 
drugs during pregnancy without demonstrating harm to the fetus.43  
For example, in Johnson v. State,  the prosecution failed to introduce 
evidence that the children involved were adversely affected by their 
mother’s crack use.44  The opining judge noted that the “birth was 
normal with no complications,” and that “[t]here was no evidence of 
fetal distress either within the womb or during the delivery.”45  
Beyond that, when the primary effect of a government policy is 
punishing poor, predominately black women having babies, a shadow 
of racial eugenics is evoked, “especially in light of the history of 
sterilization abuse of women of color.”46  Arguably, these women are 
                                                
38 Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, 
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1481 (1991). 
39 See id.  
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 1419.  
42 See id. at 1472.  
43 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290-91 (Fla. 1992) (attempting to 
prosecute a mother “delivery of a controlled substance to the infant during the thirty 
to ninety seconds following the infant’s birth, but before the umbilical cord is 
severed”). 
44 Id. at 1291.  
45 Id.  
46 Roberts, supra note 38, at 1472; see also Priscilla A. Ocen, Punishing Pregnancy: 
Race, Incarceration, and the Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners, 100 CAL. L. REV. 
1239, 1252 (2012) (“[T]he reproductive capacities of Black women have historically 
served as a primary site for punishment within the criminal justice system.  The 
intersection of race and gender in the lives of women of color, and Black women in 
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punished because they are seen as unfit to bear children due to their 
poverty, race, and drug addiction.47  Yet, it is fundamentally held that: 
The right to bear children goes to the heart of what it 
means to be human.  The value we place on individuals 
determines whether we see them as entitled to 
perpetuate themselves in their children.  Denying a 
woman the right to bear children—or punishing her for 
exercising that right—deprives her of a basic part of her 
humanity.48  
 
Protecting fetuses is a valuable government motive; however, 
enforcing unduly punitive measures against mothers is not a 
productive way to ensure fetal health.49  While fetal exposure to meth 
or other drugs is certainly not desirable, it is not detrimental enough to 
the health and development of the fetus to merit such punishments of 
the mother.50  The narrative of “meth babies” that seems to be driving 
much of this prosecution is based more on hysteria than fact.51  
In 2005, addiction specialists and medical associations released 
a letter calling for responsible and accurate reporting on the issue 
“based on science, not presumption or prejudice.”52  
The use of stigmatizing terms, such as “ice babies” and 
“meth babies,” [the doctors explained,] lack scientific 
validity and should not be used.  Experience [has 
demonstrated] that similar labels applied to children 
exposed . . . to cocaine . . . [has resulted in] lower[ed] 
expectations for their academic and life achievements, 
[has] discourag[ed] investigation into other causes for 
                                                                                                               
particular, render them vulnerable to a host of ideological constructions—including 
sexual promiscuity and bad mothering—that portray them as lacking fundamental 
aspects of feminine gender identity.  Because of these failings, women who have 
been criminalized or incarcerated are later subjected to punishments that involve the 
prevention or punishment of their choice to reproduce, often as a formal part of their 
sentences.”) (citation omitted). 
47 Roberts, supra note 38, at 1472. 
48 Id. (citing Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal 
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 (1977)).  
49 See generally id. at 1430 (explaining that “[t]he response of state prosecutors, 
legislators, and judges to the 
problem of drug-exposed babies has been punitive,” rather than preventative).  
50 See id. at 1430-32. 
51 See Letter from Doctors, Scientists, & Specialists Urging Major Media Outlets Not 
to Create “Meth Baby” Myth (July 25, 2014) [hereinafter Letter from Doctors, 
Scientists, & Specialists], 
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/%2522Meth%2522%20Open%20Letter%20-
%202005.pdf. 
52 Id.  
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their possible physical and social problems . . . , and 
lead[] to policies that ignore factors [like] poverty that 
may[] play a much more significant role in their lives.53  
 
By definition, babies cannot be addicted to meth or any other 
drugs.54  “Addiction is a technical term . . . refer[ring] to compulsive 
behavior that continues . . . [de]spite adverse consequences.”55  As 
described in the letter, “[i]n utero physiologic dependence on opiates 
(not addiction), known as Neonatal Narcotic Abstinence Syndrome, is 
readily diagnosable and treatable, but no such symptoms have been 
found to occur following prenatal cocaine or methamphetamine 
exposure.”56  
Medical professionals have warned that the spread of false 
information results in “punitive civil and child welfare interventions 
that are harmful to women, children and families rather than in the 
ongoing research and improvement and provision of treatment services 
that are so clearly needed.”57  Here, the most productive solution to 
promoting health is not to break up families by means of incarceration, 
but rather to preserve the family by helping women achieve sobriety 
and become responsible mothers.  
In 1990, “[t]he American Academy of Pediatric’s [(“AAP”)] 
Committee on Substance Abuse . . . adopted a policy statement that 
‘punitive measures taken toward pregnant women, such as criminal 
prosecutions and incarceration, have no proven benefits for infant 
health.’”58  Women in prison are taken from their families and receive 
few resources to overcome addiction.  Additionally, female prisoners 
are not afforded the opportunity to refine their parenting skills.  “The 
AAP is concerned that such involuntary measures may discourage 
mothers and their infants from receiving the very medical care and 
social support systems that are crucial to their treatment.”59  If society 
is concerned about fetal health and the development of healthy 
citizens, then incarcerating drug-addicted mothers is 
counterproductive.   
Even if imposing enhanced sentences on drug-addicted 
mothers furthered state interests in child welfare, enhanced sentences 
                                                
53 Id.   
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 Letter from Doctors, Scientists, & Specialists, supra note 51.  
58 Carol S. Larson, Overview of State Legislative and Judicial Responses, 1 FUTURE 
CHILD. 72, 80 (1991) (citing American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee On 
Substance Abuse, Drug-Exposed Infants, J. PEDIATRICS (Oct. 4, 1990)), 
https://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/01_01_06.pdf. 
59 Id. at 80 n.49.  
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would surely fail the “least restrictive alternative” standard, which 
dictates that, “even though the governmental purpose [may] be 
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means 
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be 
more narrowly achieved.”60  Currently, these enhanced sentences are 
disrupting families, failing to provide support and resources for 
women, and even deterring healthy pregnancies and encouraging the 
termination of pregnancy.61  If becoming pregnant while addicted to 
drugs subjects a woman to enhanced sentences, it affects her decision 
to become a mother.  It infringes on her liberty as a woman.  So what 
is the least restrictive alternative to further state interests in child 
welfare?  The problem of drug-exposed babies is best addressed 
through adequate prenatal care for poor women and drug treatment 
programs that meet the needs of pregnant drug-addicted women.62 
As the experiences of slavery,63 the War on Drugs, and current 
events have taught us,  government control of pregnancy punishes 
women for having babies, perpetuates the notion that a woman’s value 
is determined exclusively by her ability to procreate, and deems the 
poor, black, and drug-addicted as unworthy of the dignity of 
childbearing.64  Arguably, the government is better suited to make 
decisions about fetal care than a drug-addicted mother.  However, 
allowing the government to determine who is entitled to be a mother is 
a wholly separate matter.  State interference in the decision to have 
children is more constitutionally significant than control of lifestyle 
                                                
60 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
61 Lyttle, supra note 12, at 789-91.  
62 Id. at 789. 
63 See Ocen, supra note 46, at 1267-68 (citing DARLENE CLARK HINE, Female Slave 
Resistance: The Economics of Sex, in HINE SIGHT: BLACK WOMEN AND THE RE-
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 31 (1994)).  According to Ocen:  
[A]ttempts to resist sexual exploitation and domination contributed 
to the characterization of Black women as bad mothers. . . . Black 
women often refused to bear children who were conceived in acts 
of violence or to raise their children in a state of bondage.  The 
white slaveholding class, however, interpreted this resistance as 
evidence of Black women’s status as degenerate mothers. . . . 
[O]ne Southern physician suggested that all doctors in Hancock 
County, Georgia, were “aware of the frequent complaints of 
planters about the unnatural tendency in the African female 
population to destroy her offspring.” 
Id. at 1267.  This construction of Black women as bad mothers endured beyond 
slavery and supported a new system of racial subordination in which Black women 
continued to be exploited through the state’s policing of crime.  Id.  A new 
construction of the Black woman as an inherently dangerous and morally corrupt 
criminal appeared in post-slavery America.  Id. at 1268-69.   
64 Roberts, supra note 38, at 1472-76. 
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choices.65  Moreover, the lack of access to safe abortions and other 
resources necessary for healthy pregnancies and parenthood limit the 
reproductive freedom of many women, and disproportionately affect 
poor women of color.66  The government both directly interferes with 
their decisions and fails to facilitate them.67 
Clearly, enhancing the sentences of pregnant drug-addicted 
women is bad policy.  First, it is medically unclear how much harm 
fetuses endure.  Second, the marginal deterrence benefit of 
incarceration is outweighed by the harm incarceration causes to 
women and families.  Lastly, these sentence enhancements are 
discriminatory and conflict with abortion and other constitutional 
rights.  
B. Equal Protection  
“While officials are calling [Weld] the first case of its kind, 
criminalizing women based on their pregnancies is hardly a new 
phenomenon.” 68   “Between 1973 and 2005, there were 413 
documented cases in which a woman’s pregnancy was a necessary 
factor in the criminal charges brought against her by the state.”69  In 
addition to those 413 cases, the National Advocates for Pregnant 
Women (“NAPW”) “has identified 350 other cases in the last decade 
in which a woman’s pregnancy was a determining factor in her 
prosecution or detention.” 70   The judiciary is reading into the 
Guidelines the ability to enforce punitive sentences based on a 
degraded notion of the drug-addict, ruling as if it is their paternal 
responsibility to punish drug-addicted mothers for their choice to 
procreate.  
i. Gender  
The “criminalization of maternal substance abuse singles out 
women for punishment.”71  No similar or equal law exists for men.72  
                                                
65 See, e.g., Lyttle, supra note 12, at 789 (arguing that “states’ prosecutorial 
strategies [for prosecuting drug-addicted mothers] violate the constitutional 
guarantees to due process, equal protection, and right to privacy”).  
66 Roberts, supra note 38, at 1461-62. 
67 Id. at 1461.  “One of the most significant obstacles to receiving prenatal care is the 
inability to pay for health care services. . . . Institutional, cultural, and educational 
barriers also deter poor women of color from using the few available services.”  Id. 
at 1447 n.144.    
68 McDonough, supra note 1; see also Gwynne, supra note 15 (“Weld’s sentencing 
hike on the basis of her pregnancy was ‘unique.’”).  
69 McDonough, supra note 1; see also Jeanne Flavin & Lynn M. Paltrow, Arrests of 
and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–2005: 
Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 299, 299-300 (2013).  
70 McDonough, supra note 1. 
71 Lyttle, supra note 12, at 793.  
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Men who give pregnant women drugs and help conceive children are 
not prosecuted for the harm they cause, despite “studies which suggest 
that the sperm of male substance abusers can lead to health risks for 
the fetus.”73  “A pregnant drug-addicted woman who gives birth to a 
healthy baby, however, may still be charged under various criminal 
statutes for exposing her fetus to ‘harm.’”74  This indicates that there 
are special gender discriminatory laws in place that penalize women 
for a condition—pregnancy.  In many of these cases, women were 
deprived of basic constitutional rights of due process, and even right to 
legal counsel, because they were pregnant. 75   This “differential, 
gender-based treatment is discrimination in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution.”76 
The problem with this argument “under the Equal Protection 
Clause is that in some situations, pregnancy-based classifications may 
only receive deferential rational basis review.”77 “Although gender-
based classifications are subject to heightened, intermediate scrutiny, 
pregnancy-based classifications are not necessarily gender-based 
classifications and thus do not necessarily receive this same high level 
of scrutiny.” 78   It is incomprehensible how pregnancy-based 
classifications are not gender-based classifications, since, despite our 
most modern medical advances, men still cannot become pregnant.  
However, “[u]nder the rational basis test, the State only has to 
demonstrate that the classification is rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest,”79 so an “equal protection attack premised on sex 
                                                                                                               
72 Id. (“State prosecutors do not punish the men who help conceive the children and 
who give pregnant women drugs . . . .”).  
73 Id. (citing Julia E. Jones, State Intervention in Pregnancy, 52 LA. L. REV. 1159, 
1166-67 (1992)).  
74 Id.  
75 See Flavin & Paltrow, supra note 69, at 305-09 (summarizing cases “that illustrate 
some of the varied circumstances in which pregnant women have been deprived of 
their liberty, the different legal mechanisms used to do that, and some of the 
consequences of those deprivations”). 
76 Lyttle, supra note 12, at 793; see also id. at 793 n.93 (citing Michelle Oberman, 
Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant Women 
Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 527-31 (1992) (concluding that a Minnesota 
law regarding the reporting of prenatal exposure to controlled substances would fail 
intermediate scrutiny, given that the government interest in pre-viable fetal life is not 
sufficient to permit state regulation of mothers’ bodies)). 
77 Lyttle, supra note 12, at 793; see also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 
(1974).  
78 Lyttle, supra note 12, at 793; see also Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (“While it is 
true that only woman can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative 
classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification . . . .”). 
79 Lyttle, supra note 12, at 794; see also Louise M. Chan, S.O.S. From the Womb: A 
Call for New York Legislation Criminalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 199, 224 (1993).  
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discrimination” would likely not prohibit the prosecution of drug-
addicted pregnant women.80   
ii. Race 
Many studies indicate that white and African-American women 
use drugs during pregnancy at similar rates.81  However, “another 
study indicates that a pregnant African-American woman is almost ten 
times more likely than a pregnant white woman to be reported to 
health authorities for drug use.”82  “This gross racial disparity in 
reporting and the subsequent prosecution and sentencing of drug-
addicted women leads . . . to a belie[f] that [there is] a discriminatory 
purpose motivat[ing] state prosecutors’ desire to make maternal 
substance abuse a crime.”83  
However, “[s]uch disparities do not prove that the prosecutions 
are unconstitutional . . . because the Supreme Court has interpreted 
racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause narrowly,” 
requiring discriminatory intent in addition to a disparate impact.84  “It 
is difficult to prove that the State, in its prosecutions for maternal 
substance abuse, actually intended to discriminate against pregnant, 
drug-addicted, African-American women.”85  In order to prove such 
intent, “a litigant would most likely have to show evidence indicating a 
pattern of disparate treatment that is unexplainable” on any other 
grounds, “or is a departure from the normal procedures for bringing 
charges against drug-addicted women.”86  
While prosecuting pregnant-drug addicted women may not be 
facially racially discriminatory, race is certainly implicated in the 
prosecutions and subsequent sentencing of pregnant drug-addicted 
women, as evidenced above, and should be considered in analyzing the 
validity of the use of child endangerment enhancements.  
 
 
                                                
80 Lyttle, supra note 12, at 794. 
81 Id. (citing Kathleen R. Sandy, The Discrimination Inherent in America’s Drug 
War: Hidden Racism Revealed by Examining the Hysteria Over Crack, 54 ALA. L. 
REV. 665, 687 (2003)).   
82 Lyttle, supra note 12, at 794-95 (citing Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of 
Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory 
Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1204 (1990)).  
83 Id. at 795. 
84 Id.; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976).  
85 Lyttle, supra note 12, at 795.  
86 Id. at 795-96 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
266 (1977) (discussing factors that are relevant to proving racially discriminatory 
purpose, such as “a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,” “[t]he 
historical background of the decision,” “legislative or administrative history” of 
official state actions, and “departures from the normal procedural sequence”)). 
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C. Right to Privacy  
Punishing women for having babies violates their 
constitutional right to privacy for many reasons.  First, it violates 
women’s right to autonomy over their reproductive decisions. 87  
Second, it creates a discriminatory government standard for 
childbearing.88  Using the privacy doctrine to advocate for women is 
useful because it emphasizes the value of personhood and protects 
against abuse of government power.89  
People who use illegal drugs are already subject to punishment 
under an array of criminal laws in this country.90  “Pregnant women 
are not exempt,” and they too can be prosecuted under these laws.91  
However, punishing drug addicts who choose to carry their 
pregnancies to term unconstitutionally burdens the right to autonomy 
over their reproductive decisions as established in Roe v. Wade.92   
In Roe, the [U.S.] Supreme Court held that the right to 
privacy, “whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and 
restrictions upon state action . . . or . . . in the Ninth 
Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is 
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”93  
 
By violating poor, predominately black women’s reproductive rights, 
the government “perpetuate[s] a racist hierarchy in our society.”94  
Thus, the “[p]rosecutions . . . impose a standard of motherhood that is 
offensive to both principles of equality and privacy.”95 
“[A] woman does not lose her right to privacy simply because 
she becomes pregnant.”96  Pregnant women remain persons under the 
Constitution, and the “constitutional right to privacy ‘extends to both 
women and men, regardless of their biological differences.’”97  For 
these reasons, “[s]tates’ mechanisms [for punishing drug-addicted 
                                                
87 Roberts, supra note 38, at 1463, 1468.  
88 Id. at 1463-64; see also Lyttle, supra note 12, at 797.  
89 Roberts, supra note 38, at 1468.  
90 Larson, supra note 58, at 74.  
91 Id.  
92 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Lyttle, supra note 12, at 796. 
93 Lyttle, supra note 12, at 796 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 153).  
94 Roberts, supra note 38, at 1425.  
95 Id.   
96 Lyttle, supra note 12, at 796. 
97 Id. (quoting Deanna R. Reitman, Note, The Collision Between the Rights of 
Women, the Rights of the Fetus and the Rights of the State: A Critical Analysis of the 
Criminal Prosecution of Drug Addicted Pregnant Women, 16 ST. JOHN’S J.L COMM. 
267, 302-03 (2002)).  
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women]—prosecution by child abuse, endangerment, controlled 
substance abuse, manslaughter, and homicide statutes—infringe upon 
[their] . . . fundamental right to privacy because these mechanisms 
punish [drug-addicted women] . . . simply for exercising [their] . . . 
constitutional right to procreate.”98  Women have a “constitutional 
right ‘to become pregnant and give birth despite drug dependence.’”99  
“Punishing a woman for her behavior during pregnancy infringes upon 
her personal autonomy,” her right to be “free from interference by 
others, and . . . [her] ability to flourish among and in relation to 
others.”100 
Those who support enhanced sentences believe that a woman’s 
freedom must be jeopardized in order to convince her to stop using 
drugs or to enroll in a treatment program.101  Criminal prosecutions, 
however, may do just the opposite.102  Fear of prosecution will deter 
these women, who already lack many of the resources necessary for a 
healthy pregnancy, “from seeking care, confiding in their doctors, and 
participating in treatment.”103  
There is a strong tie between abortion rights and criminalizing 
dangerous behavior while pregnant. 104   The threat of enhanced 
sentences weighs on a woman’s choice to have children, a strong 
liberty and privacy interest.105  Women fearing criminal prosecution 
for drug-abuse while pregnant are less likely to seek help or carry their 
pregnancies to term. 106   “The states’ prosecutorial strategies 
discourage pregnant drug-addicted women from seeking pre- and post-
natal care because of fear.”107  This fear of punishment could force 
                                                
98 Id. 
99 Id. (quoting Brief for Am. Pub. Health Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Defendant, People v. Gilligan (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (No. 2003-1192), 
http://www.nyclu. Org/rrp_gilligan_amicus_110503.html).  
100 Id. at 796-97 (citation omitted).  
101 Larson, supra note 58, at 75, 80; see also Lyttle, supra note 12, at 786 (“Michigan 
prosecutor Tony Tague argued that underlying the general deterrence objective of the 
criminal prosecution of pregnant drug-addicted women is the hope that it will 
encourage women to seek drug treatment.”). 
102 Larson, supra note 58, at 80. 
103 Id. (“Many of these opponents also believe that this deterrence will result from 
automatically involving the child protective services agency when a pregnant woman 
uses drugs.”).  
104 See Lyttle, supra note 12, at 796-97.  
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 790. 
107 Id. (citing Over 50 Public Health Organizations, Experts, and Related Advocates 
Condemn the Prosecution of Pregnant Woman, NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT 
WOMEN (Oct. 30, 2003), 
http://www.advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/issues/pr_ltr_gilligan.htm).  
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drug-addicted women to turn to abortion.108  “[T]he government’s 
[chief] response to the crisis of drug-exposed babies should be the 
recognition of their mother’s worth and entitlement to autonomy over 
their reproduction lives.”109  The proper solution to ensure healthy 
babies, and therefore a healthy society, is a government committed to 
“guaranteeing these fundamental rights of poor women . . . rather than 
punishing them.”110 
“The right to privacy argument . . . is limited by the State’s 
interest in protecting the life of the unborn.”111 Indeed, “the right to 
privacy is not absolute.”112  “It must be balanced against the State’s 
interest in protecting the potential life that the pregnant drug-addicted 
woman is carrying.”113  However, “there is rarely, if ever, a context in 
which the State is justified in using the criminal justice system to 
interfere with a woman’s child-bearing decisions.”114 
 
D. Due Process  
The Due Process Clause: 
[R]equires that [w]hen an individual’s life, liberty or 
property is to be curtailed by the government, that 
individual must receive notice from the government, 
which usually occurs through the publication of laws 
passed by the legislature.  The State violates the fair 
notice requirement of due process when it fails to a 
warn drug-addicted woman that her fetus will be treated 
as a child or victim and that she will be . . . a criminal 
offender for “harming” her fetus for purposes of child 
abuse, neglect, endangerment, homicide, manslaughter, 
and controlled substance abuse statutes.115  
 
                                                
108 Id.  
 
109 Roberts, supra note 38, at 1482. 
110 Id.  
111 Lyttle, supra note 12, at 797 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (“The woman’s liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from 
the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later 
point in fetal development the State’s interest in life has sufficient force so that the 
right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted.”)).  
112 Id.  
113 Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“[A]t some point the state 
interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become 
dominant.”)). 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 792 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Margaret Phillips, Comment, 
Umbilical Cords: The New Drug Connection, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 540 (1992)). 
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Women do “not have fair notice that child abuse, neglect, 
endangerment, homicide, manslaughter, and controlled substance 
statutes apply to [their] . . . maternal behavior’s potential, and actual, 
effects on . . . [their] fetus[es].”116 
The Due Process argument, however, is “weakened because 
states have been prosecuting drug-addicted women for their behavior 
during pregnancy since the late 1970s,” which makes it “difficult to 
accept the claim that these women lack fair notice.”117  The “extensive 
media coverage reporting on . . . babies exposed to drugs in the womb” 
may also provide some degree of “notice that their behavior could 
potentially harm their fetuses.”118 Still, women may not be aware that 
the statutes written to protect children apply to fetuses. 
 
IV. SENTENCING 
Prosecutors and proponents of criminalizing drug-addicted 
women believe that “severe punishments [will] act as disincentives for 
women who are likely to engage in drug use . . . during pregnancy.”119  
They claim “that the creation of crimes that punish women who 
endanger their fetuses would educate the public through ‘the publicity 
accompanying the trial, conviction, and sentencing’ of the ‘proper 
distinctions between good and bad behavior.’”120  They “have sought 
to accomplish . . . deterrence and the protection of potential life by 
prosecuting drug-addicted women under an array of criminal 
statutes.”121  
Some mechanisms that prosecutors have used to prosecute 
drug-addicted women are manslaughter and homicide statutes.122  “In 
State v. McKnight, Regina McKnight, a twenty-two-year-old African-
American woman, was charged with homicide by child abuse after 
experiencing a stillbirth.” 123   In McKnight’s case, “[t]he South 
Carolina Supreme Court held that under South Carolina law, a viable 
                                                
116 Id.  
117 Lyttle, supra note 12, at 792.  
118 Id. (citing Shona B. Glink, Note, The Prosecution of Maternal Fetal Abuse: Is this 
the Answer?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 538-39 (1991) (explaining how the media’s 
extensive coverage of the growing drug problem in United States, particularly among 
pregnant women, has contributed to the public’s awareness of the effects of drug use 
on fetuses)). 
119 Id. at 786.  
120 Id. (quoting Elizabeth L. Thompson, Note, The Criminalization of Maternal 
Conduct During Pregnancy: A Decisionmaking Model for Lawmakers, 64 IND. L.J. 
357, 367 (1989)).  
121 Id. at 787. 
122 Id. at 788.  
123 Lyttle, supra note 12,  at 788 (citing State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 
(S.C. 2003)).  
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fetus is a ‘child’ within the meaning of the child abuse statute.”124 
While “prosecutors contend that punishing drug-addicted 
women protects the potential fetal life from abuse and ensures the 
fetus’s right to bodily integrity, . . . [t]he Supreme Court has held that 
the word ‘person’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
include the unborn.”125  The “unborn are therefore not entitled to 
constitutional protection,” despite what prosecutors argue, when they 
claim “that the fetus is a person entitled to legally recognized rights 
such as bodily integrity and right to life.”126  
 
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines  
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”), 
establishing the United States Sentencing Commission.127  The SRA, 
through the Sentencing Commission, was designed to:  
Promulgate judicial federal sentencing guidelines, 
establishing the “policies and practices” that would 
“provide certainty and fairness in . . . sentencing, 
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities” between 
like offenders guilty of like criminal conduct, while 
maintaining sufficient flexibility to allow for 
consideration of individual mitigating and aggravating 
factors not taken into account by established general 
sentencing practices.128  
 
Congress had three main objectives in sentencing reform: 
honesty, uniformity, and proportionality. 129   The first objective—
honesty—aimed at reducing the disparity between time sentenced and 
time served, and eliminating confusion regarding how sentencing 
decisions were made.130  The second objective—uniformity—hoped to 
increase consistency “between the federal courts in sentencing like 
offenders for like criminal conduct.” 131   The final objective—
proportionality—sought to sentence “defendants in a manner 
                                                
124 Id. at 789 (citing McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 174-75).   
125 Id. at 786-87 (citations omitted).   
126 Id. at 787.  
127 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2015) (“There is established as an independent commission in 
the judicial branch of the United States a United States Sentencing Commission 
which shall consist of seven voting members and one nonvoting member.”).  
128 John Garry, Why Me: Application and Misapplication 3A1.1 the Vulnerable 
Victim Enhancement of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 
143, 148-49 (1993) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A)-(C) (1988)). 
129 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014).  
130 Id. 
131 Garry, supra note 128, at 150 (citing U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A). 
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consistent with the severity of their particular criminal conduct.”132  
“The Commission identifies a rift between proponents . . . who call for 
scaling punishment to the ‘offender’s culpability and resulting 
harms,’” and opponents “who advocate the imposition of punishment 
based on ‘practical crime control considerations.’”133 
The Guidelines, promulgated by the Commission, “consider 
the nature and seriousness of the offense, as well as the history and 
characteristics of the defendant.”134  The Guidelines also aim “to 
promote respect for the law,” provide proportional punishment for 
offenses, serve as an “adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” 
protect the public from future criminal activity, and provide 
opportunities for rehabilitation.135  “Other goals of the SRA may be to 
reduce the use of incarceration in sentencing,” when possible, “and 
increase public confidence in the criminal justice system.”136  While 
judges are required to consult the Guidelines during sentencing, the 
Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory.137  Despite their advisory 
nature, it remains important for judges “to keep this legislative intent 
in mind when interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines.”138 
In theory, the “application of the Guidelines is a mechanical 
process.”139  The Guidelines Manual (“Manual”) provides judges with 
general application principles.140  In reality, however, there is a great 
deal of judicial discretion as the “judge identifies the component parts 
that will yield the fully calculated sentence.”141  
First, the judge must refer to “the statutory index, which cross-
references the federal statutes with guideline sections,” to determine 
the applicable guideline section.142  The applicable guideline “provides 
a base level offense, which, in turn, is adjusted by specific offense 
characteristics.”143  The judge “then applies the various sections of 
                                                
132 Id. (citing U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A). 
133 Id. (citations omitted). 
134 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2015). 
135 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); see also Garry, supra note 128, at 149. 
136  Rebecca L. Spiro, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Rehnquist Court: 
Theories of Statutory Interpretation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 120-21 (2000) 
(citation omitted).  
137  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (establishing that the 
Guidelines are “effectively advisory”).  Justice Breyer, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 
indicated that the sentencing judge must consider the guideline ranges, but is free “to 
tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.”  Id. at 245-46. 
138 Spiro, supra note 136, at 121. 
139 Garry, supra note 128, at 151.  
140 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014); see also Garry, supra note 128, at 151. 
141 Garry, supra note 128, at 151.  
142 Id. (citing U.S.S.G. app. A; U.S.S.G. § 1B1). 
143 Id.  
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Chapter Three of the . . . Manual to the base offense level.”144  These 
“adjustments [are] for factors involving the characteristics of the 
victims, the role that the defendant played in the offense, and any 
obstruction of the proceedings by the defendant.”145  Lastly, the judge 
“uses separate calculations to compute a sentencing range based on . . . 
a sentencing table contained in Chapter Five.”146  The range considers 
“probation, restitution, imprisonment, community confinement, and 
fines.” 147   The judge may then decide whether “an upward or 
downward departure is appropriate” and “sentence the defendant 
within the calculated range.”148  
Despite the Guidelines, there is great judicial discretion in 
sentencing, which now rests on a reasonableness analysis. 149   In 
Weld’s case, however, enhancing her sentence on the grounds of 
“substantial risk of harm to a minor” because she was involved in the 
manufacture of meth while pregnant, seems unreasonable.150  It does 
not effectively further state interests in promoting fetal health, but 
instead promulgates an excessively punitive system, restricts women’s 
rights, and implicates constitutional concerns.  
 
B. Gender and the Guidelines  
While the Guidelines are supposed to remove gender as a 
factor, it is clear that gender is a factor in many crimes, trials, and 
sentencing decisions.151  Judge Varlan made Weld’s gender an issue 
by enhancing her sentence with child endangerment and substantial 
risk of harm to a minor enhancements as a result of her pregnancy.152  
His gendered deviation from the Guidelines, however, did not have to 
result in an upward departure.  There were opportunities for downward 
departures as well, including Section 5H1.6 “Family Ties and 
                                                
144 Id. at 152.  
145 Id. (citing U.S.S.G. §§ 3A1.1-3A1.3, 3B1.1-3B1.4, 3C1.1). 
146 Id. (citing U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A).  
147 Garry, supra note 128, at 151 (citing U.S.S.G. §§ 5B1.1-5G1.3). 
148 Id.; see also id. at 152 n.47 (“A judge’s power to depart from a sentencing range 
is carefully circumscribed under the Guidelines and departure is strictly reviewed at 
the appellate level.  But see United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1309 (2nd Cir. 
1993) (advocating departure based on offender characteristics because ‘departure in 
the appropriate case is essential to the satisfactory functioning of the sentencing 
system’”)).  
149 Id. at 152.  
150 See Lacey Weld Sentenced to More Than 12 Years, supra note 3; see also United 
States v. Weld, 619 F. App’x 512, 513 (6th Cir. 2015). 
151 See Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in A Post-Booker Federal 
Guidelines World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 693 (2006).  
152 Weld, 619 F. App’x at 513. 
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Responsibilities,” Section 5K2.20 “Aberrant Behavior,” and Section 
3E1.1 “Acceptance of Responsibility.”153  
Scholars contend that it is appropriate to consider gender in 
sentencing cases, but not to enhance penalties for non-violent drug-
addicted mothers, which only serves to keep mothers away from their 
children, and further reduce chances of getting sober and obtaining 
future employment.154  The Guidelines make an “effort to produce 
identical sentences for males and females who commit similar 
crimes;” however, this has never been successful. 155   Instead, it 
imposes excessive and oppressive “costs on families as well as women 
who do not resemble the violent male drug dealers who inspired the 
severe federal drug penalties.” 156   Therefore, “gender-related 
differences can play a legitimate role in sentencing.”157  Because “by 
ignoring the gendered realities of caregiving,” a completely gender-
neutral sentencing scheme “has the potential of increasing 
intergenerational crime.”158  
 
V. JUDGE VARLAN’S UNFOUNDED INTERPRETATION OF THE 
GUIDELINES IN WELD 
  Judge Varlan’s imposition of an enhanced sentence in Weld’s 
case was inappropriate.  Applying the child endangerment 
enhancement of “substantial risk of harm to a minor” to a woman 
charged with manufacturing meth is bad policy because it conflicts 
with important constitutional values, and it improperly interprets the 
Guidelines purported principles.  While substantial risk of harm to a 
minor has been a permissible child endangerment enhancement in 
other contexts, as a matter of interpretation, it should not apply to 
Lacey Weld.  
 The United States Code guides judges by providing that:  
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or 
of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of . . . 
agencies of the United States, the words “person,” 
“human being,” “child,” and “individual,” shall include 
every infant member of the species homo sapiens who 
                                                
153 See Raeder, supra note 151, at 717-18, 737-38.  
154 See generally id. at 692 (arguing that downward deviations based on gender can 
and should be appropriate for mothers).   
155 Id.   
156 Id.  
157 Id. (emphasis added). 
158 Id.  
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is born alive at any stage of development.159   
 
The U.S.C. goes on to describe “born alive,” which was clearly not at 
issue in this case because the fetus was still in Weld’s womb.160  
Additionally, the U.S.C. states, in pertinent part, that the section 
quoted above shall not “be construed to affirm, deny, or expand any 
legal status or legal right applicable to any member of the species 
homo sapiens at any point prior to being ‘born alive.’”161  Here, fetuses 
are clearly not accounted for, as they are not a person, human being, 
child, or individual under the letter of the law.162  Therefore, applying 
the substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor enhancement is 
inappropriate.  
Section 2D1.1(b) of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines provides for an increase of six offense levels when the 
defendant engages in the manufacture of methamphetamine and 
creates a substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor or an 
incompetent. 163   In determining whether the offense created a 
substantial risk of harm to human life, the court may consider factors 
such as the quantity of chemicals found in the laboratory, manor in 
which the toxic substances were disposed of, duration of the offense, 
extent of the manufacturing operation, and location of the 
laboratory.164  
Here, then, the question becomes whether a fetus is a minor or 
an incompetent for the purposes of sentencing.  In Section 2D1.1, 
“incompetent” is defined as “an individual who is incapable of taking 
care of the individual’s self or property because of a mental or physical 
illness or disability, mental retardation, or senility.”165  This clearly 
does not apply to a fetus, as a fetus is not an individual lacking the 
capacity to care for itself due to “mental or physical illness, disability, 
mental retardation, or senility.” 166   Thus, for the purposes of 
                                                
159 1 U.S.C. § 8(a) (2015).  
160 Id. § 8(b) (defining “born alive” as “the complete expulsion or extraction from his 
or her mother of that member, at any stage of development, who after such expulsion 
or extraction breathes or has a beating heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or 
definite movement of voluntary muscles, regardless of whether the umbilical cord 
has been cut, and regardless of whether the expulsion or extraction occurs as a result 
of natural or induced labor, cesarean section, or induced abortion”).  
161 Id. § 8(c).  
162 See id. § 8(a)-(c).  
163 18 U.S.C.S. App’x § 2D1.1(b)(13)(D) (LEXIS through PL 114-115). 
164 18 U.S.C.S. App’x § 608(b)(1)(B) (LEXIS through PL 114-114) (explaining that 
the provisions include substantial risk of harm to the environment as well as to a 
minor or incompetent). 
165 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. 18(B)(ii) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
166 Id.  
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sentencing, a fetus does not meet the definition of “an incompetent.”167   
The Guidelines go on to define “minor” as: 
(A) an individual who had not attained the age of 18 
years; (B) an individual, whether fictitious or not, who 
a law enforcement officer represented to a participant 
(i) had not attained the age of 18 years, and (ii) could be 
provided for the purposes of engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct; or (C) an undercover law enforcement 
officer who represented to a participant that the officer 
had not attained the age of 18 years.168   
 
Is a fetus an individual who has not attained the age of eighteen years?  
Merriam-Webster defines minor as a “person who is not yet old 
enough to have the rights of an adult.”169  Based on these definitions, a 
fetus is arguably not a person or an individual and, therefore, not a 
minor.  Allowing a fetus to be classified as a minor creates de facto 
fetal personhood, which has been explicitly prohibited by the laws of 
this country.170  The legal status of fetuses is hotly contested and 
allowing laws designed to protect minors, people not old enough to 
have the rights of adults, to extend to fetuses would create policy 
problems and alienate much of the population. 
Fortunately, however, existing case law can provide guidance 
and avoid these pitfalls.  In United States v. Carney, the defendant was 
convicted of conspiracy to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense 500 
grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable 
amount of methamphetamine,” and carrying a firearm in furtherance of 
the crime.171  Carney was sentenced using a six-level sentencing 
enhancement pursuant to Section § 2D1.1(b)(5)(C) of the Guidelines, 
and he appealed.172  The appellate court held that the substantial risk of 
harm to the life of a minor enhancement did not “apply whenever 
manufacture of meth[] caused a substantial risk of any type of harm to 
a minor,” but rather, the sentencing enhancement required “a type of 
harm that could cause death or serious injury that would adversely 
affect the life of a minor.”173  
“Carney argue[d] that the phrase ‘harm to the life of a minor’ 
                                                
167 Id.  
168 U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 cmt. 1.  
169 Minor, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/minor 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2016). 
170 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973) (explaining that because abortion is 
legal, fetuses cannot have personhood status, or abortions would be criminalized as 
murder). 
171 United States v. Carney, 117 F. App’x 928, 929 (5th Cir. 2004).  
172 Id. at 929. 
173 Id. at 930-31 (emphasis added).  
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contemplates serious harm, not just any harm.”174  “[T]he government 
argued that the words ‘to the life’ are inconsequential surplusage.”175  
On appeal, the court held that “[t]he district court simply erred by 
dismissing the words ‘to the life’ when interpreting the guideline[s],” 
noting that “Congress chose the specific words” to carry meaning.176  
Following the rules of statutory construction, the court noted that “the 
plain and unambiguous meaning of the statutory language” must be 
followed and that the statute must “be construed . . . [so] that every 
word has some operative effect.”177 
The appellate court concluded that “[i]f Congress had intended 
for § 2D1.1(b)(5)(C) to apply whenever the manufacture of 
methamphetamine caused a substantial risk of any type of harm to a 
minor, then it would have passed a law that said ‘substantial risk of 
harm to a minor.’”178  However, Congress instead “passed a law that 
requires a substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor.”179  The 
inclusion of “‘to the life’ indicates that Congress wanted to punish 
situations in which children faced a substantial risk of serious harm, as 
opposed to any type of harm.”180  Therefore, “[h]arm ‘to the life of a 
minor’ suggests a type of harm that could cause death or a serious 
injury that would adversely affect the life of a minor.”181 
Carney can be applied to Weld’s case.  As discussed above, the 
harm that Weld may have exposed her fetus to, in the manufacturing 
of meth, is not the type of harm that would “cause death or serious 
injury that would adversely affect the life of a minor.”182  Indeed, 
Weld’s son was born alive, and although he suffered severe 
withdrawal symptoms,183 the symptoms are unlikely to persist or affect 
his health in the future.  
 
 
 
                                                
174 Id. at 930.  
175 Id.  
176 Id.  
177 Carney, 117 F. App’x at 930. (citing United States v. Kay, 59 F.3d 738, 742 (5th 
Cir. 2004)).  
178 Id.  
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id.; see also Letter from Doctors, Scientists, & Specialists, supra note 51 (“In 
utero physiologic dependence on opiates (not addiction), known as Neonatal 
Narcotic Abstinence Syndrome, is readily diagnosable and treatable, but no such 
symptoms have been found to occur following prenatal cocaine or methamphetamine 
exposure.”). 
183 Lacey Weld Sentenced to More Than 12 Years, supra note 3 (explaining that the 
baby “suffered from withdrawals for almost six weeks”).  
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VI. CONCLUSION  
Allowing judges to consider pregnancy when sentencing drug-
addicted women is another mechanism for devaluation and 
suppression.  This creates ex post facto law and fetal personhood, 
whose life is valued higher than that of its mother— a judicial fiat.  
Fetuses are not minors within the meaning of the Guidelines, and even 
if a judge were to interpret the word “minor” to include fetuses, the 
harm caused by in-utero meth exposure does not warrant the use of the 
“substantial risk of harm to a minor” enhancement.  Keeping women 
away from their children and families not only makes them wards of 
the state, it also leaves the government to support the families on the 
outside.  Additionally, prisons fail to offer the treatment programs that 
these women need to become competent mothers and contributing 
members of society.  
As evidenced above, the enhanced sentences are 
counterproductive.  Judges should not have the discretion to enhance a 
pregnant drug user’s sentence beyond what was explicitly permitted by 
Congress.  Treatment, including early intervention and rehabilitative 
services, is what states should utilize to address the problem of drug-
exposed newborns.  
Using the child endangerment enhancement in the Guidelines 
to justify harsher sentences for pregnant women, while not strictly 
unconstitutional, nevertheless implicates constitutional rights to 
privacy and personal autonomy, fosters racism, and impedes the goal 
of healthy families.  Criminally prosecuting pregnant drug-addicted 
women creates a conflict between women’s rights to privacy and 
personal autonomy, the rights of fetuses to physical integrity, and the 
right of the state to protect potential human life.  
As seen in Judge Varlan’s decision, there is a state interest in 
protecting potential human life, and prosecutors are using criminal 
sanctions to protect the physical integrity of fetuses and justify 
punishment of pregnant women.  However, the results of these 
prosecutions are counter to the state’s goal.  The effect is the 
unjustified subordination of women and denial of constitutional 
guarantees.  
 
